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1. Introduction
A common feature among many asset pricing models in financial economics is the relation
of expected returns on risky securities to the covariance between those securities’ returns and an
economic aggregate like (the marginal utility of) aggregate wealth or consumption. In empirical
work, this economic aggregate (central to the pricing model under consideration) is generally un-
observable and requires a proxy. Tests of the given model which, by necessity, are based on the
proxy are confronted with a joint hypothesis that complicates the interpretation of a rejection of the
model’s prediction. In particular, does this rejection signal a violation of the model’s result or the
poor quality of the proxy chosen to render the model "testable"? In specific regard to the capital
asset pricing model (CAPM), the existence of this dual hypothesis led Roll (1977) to conclude that
the "theory is not testable unless the exact composition of the true market portfolio is known and
used in the tests" (p. 130).
Roll’s critique was met by two possible ways forward. First, since validity of the CAPM and
mean-variance efficiency of the market return are equivalent, if the proxy is not mean-variance
efficient, then any "test" based on this proxy seems besides the point. This stance led to the devel-
opment of tests for mean-variance efficiency of a proxy, with Gibbons, Ross, and Shanken (1989)
serving as the prominent example and MacKinlay and Richardson (1991) providing a useful gen-
eralization. Second, if the proxy is invalid (i.e., not mean-variance efficient), then the CAPM pre-
diction based upon this proxy should not be expected to hold exactly, only approximately. From
this stance, bounds on the deviations from exact CAPM pricing were developed based upon the
relative efficiency of the proxy (i.e., its distance inside the mean-variance frontier). Examples of
this approach include Shanken (1987) as well as Kandel and Stambaugh (1987, 1995).
This paper extends the literature on relative efficiency testing by developing a pricing restriction
that reflects the way in which (1) a proxy return relates to the market return and (2) individual
security returns relate to the proxy. The first relation is addressed in the works of Shanken (1987)
and Kandel and Stambaugh (1987). The second is the principal contribution of this paper. A
general outline of the approach is as follows. The measure of relative efficiency is the correlation
between the proxy return and the market return denoted by . A prior belief on the true value of
 is denoted by 0. A value for  is computed as the upper bound to a multivariate statistic of
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CAPM pricing errors measured against the proxy. If this value is less than 0, such is interpreted
as evidence against the CAPM. This approach is a conditional test of the CAPM based upon a prior
belief about the relative efficiency of the proxy. If the proxy is determined to be too far inside the
mean-variance frontier, the market return is concluded to be inefficient as well.
Any test of relative efficiency assumes, to some extent, that the proxy return mismeasures
the market return. A common starting point for most of these tests is the assumption that the
relationship between security returns and the proxy return can be explained by a projection of the
former onto the latter. Suppose that mismeasurement of the market return by the proxy return is
taken to mean that certain components relevant to the market return are excluded from the proxy.
Then, the extent to which these excluded components are correlated with the proxy return will
determine the extent to which innovations to the familiar market model will tend to covary with
that proxy return, since those innovations will contain the aforementioned omitted components.
In other words, mismeasurement renders the proxy return endogenous to the market model. The
resulting structural equation will, therefore, differ from a projection equation. This paper shows
that relative efficiency tests based upon projections are biased towards rejecting the CAPM because
these tests overstate a proxy’s distance away from the mean-variance frontier. Mismeasurement of
the market return is the source of this bias.
A relative efficiency test based upon the aforementioned structural equation as opposed to the
commonly used OLS projection requires a consistent estimator for the former in order to render the
test feasible empirically. Towards that end, an estimator for linear equations with an endogenous
regressor proposed by Prono (2008) is utilized. This estimator bases identification on exclusionary
restrictions within the functional form describing heteroskedasticity in security returns and is a
higher-moment analog to common instrumental variables techniques. MacKinlay and Richardson
(1991) demonstrate that heteroskedasticity in market model residuals can meaningfully impact
the results of mean variance efficiency tests for a given proxy return. This paper extends these
authors’ findings to tests of relative efficiency, noting that a particular form of heteroskedasticity
can be used to describe not only the second moment patterns of market model residuals but also
the co-movement of these residuals with the proxy return caused by the latter’s mismeasurement
of the market return (MacKinlay and Richardson (1991), among others, assume this co-movement
to be zero).
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The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Starting from a rather general pricing
model, Section 2 develops a pricing restriction that can be used to test the CAPM conditional on
a prior belief about the correlation between the market return and the proxy used in the test. This
restriction fully encompasses the difference between the market return and an imperfect proxy.
Section 3 reviews a conventional test of relative mean-variance efficiency. Section 4 presents an
overview of the econometrics used to identify and estimate a structural market model. Section 5
details a method for conducting a test of relative mean-variance efficiency that is based upon the
econometric techniques developed in section 4. Section 6 summarizes the results from employing
this test, comparing them to the results of the conventional method reviewed in section 3. Section
7 presents the results of a Monte Carlo study of the test proposed in section 5 against conventional
alternatives. Section 8 proposes a generalization of the pricing restriction in section 2 that provides
a direct link between mismeasurement of the market return and time-variation in beta. Section 9
concludes.
2. Pricing Restriction
Assume there exists an observable risk-free rate. Let rt be an N -vector of observable excess
security returns. Define mt as a scalar unobservable economic aggregate and rm;t as the excess
return on an unobservable portfolio of securities that is efficient with respect to excess security
returns inclusive of rt (i.e., the market return). Let rp;t be a scalar proxy for rm;t, and assume that
theN+1 components of rt and rp;t are linearly independent. Consider the following pricing model
E [rt] = Cov [mt; rt] (1)
that relates expected excess returns to the covariance between excess returns and the economic
aggregate. Further suppose
mt =
 
E

rm;t

2

rm;t
! rm;t (2)
so that the economic aggregate is proportional to the market return. Then (1) and (2) imply
E [rt] = E

rm;t

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where
 =
Cov

rm;t; rt

2

rm;t
 ;
which is the familiar CAPM of Sharpe (1964) and Lintner (1965).
The model of (1) and (2) is equivalent to the linear multivariate regression
rt =  + rm;t + et; (3)
where E

etrm;t

= 0 by construction, and  = 0. If the market return were observable, the zero
constraint on alpha would be the single testable restriction of the CAPM. Under the current set-up,
however, alpha is immeasurable, and, as a consequence, the theory is untestable. What is lacking
is a link between the market return and the observable proxy. In order to provide that link, assume
rm;t = rp;t + t; (4)
which casts the relationship between the market return and proxy return as a form of measurement
error.3 (4) is a generalization of (17) in Jagannathan and Wang (1996) if vw = 1. (4) is also a
close counterpart to the decomposition of a proxy return used to develop the CAPM for inefficient
portfolios (CAPMI) in Diacogiannis and Feldman (2006), with the differences being (i) t is not
assumed to be uncorrelated with rm;t and (ii) the expected value of t is not, necessarily, zero.
The variable t reflects components to the market return that are excluded from the proxy return.
Examples of these components include returns to nontraded assets and/or the returns to human
capital.4 Substitution of (4) into (3) produces
rt =  + rp;t + et (5)
3t is measurement error in a general sense not in a classical sense, since the assumption that t? rm;t; rt is not
made. There is good reason for this omission, since given what the measurement error is intended to reflect, t is
related to both rm;t and rt.
4Studies by Campbell (1996), Jagannathan and Wang (1996), and Dittmar (2002) note the importance of the returns
to human capital in pricing expected returns.
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where
 =  + E [t] ;  =  (6)et = et + et; et = t   E [t]
(5) is the measurable analog to (3). Notice that  6= 0 even if the CAPM holds, thus complicating
a test of the theory if the proxy is not the market. In addition, note that according to Diacogiannis
and Feldman (2006), rp;t and t must be correlated. From (5),
Cov
et; rp;t = Cov t; rp;t =   Cov t; rm;t  2 [t] :
In general, this expression is not zero, which is to say that rp;t is an endogenous regressor in (5).
As a result, (5) is a structural equation that unlike (3) cannot, necessarily, be treated as a linear
projection without loss of generality. The fact that the market return is unobservable and any
proxy return, by definition, is incomplete affords this distinction. The effects of this distinction
on measuring the efficiency of a proxy return relative to the market return is made explicit in the
proposition and corollaries to follow.
In the context of (1), empirically-based asset pricing models attempt to tie the unobservable
economic aggregate mt to observable variables. Towards that end, consider a linear projection of
mt onto rp;t:
mt = a+ brp;t + em;t: (7)
According to Lemma 1 of Shanken (1987),
Cov
et; em;t0 1e Cov et; em;t  2 (mt)  1  2 (8)
where e is the covariance matrix of residuals from (5), and  is the correlation between mt and
rp;t. A proof of (8) along with proofs to all propositions and corollaries is stated in the Appendix.
The right-hand-side of (8) is the variance of em;t. Equality holds if and only if em;t is an exact
linear combination of et. Therefore, (8) simply states that the r-squared value from a regression of
em;t on et can be at most one. From Shanken (1987), Cov et; em;t "may be interpreted as a vector
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of deviations from an exact [single] beta expected return relation" (p. 93). The inequality places
an upper bound on these deviations and is useful in determining a similar bound for deviations
from CAPM pricing measured with respect to a proxy return. Proposition 1 formalizes this result
in light of the nonzero covariance between et and rp;t in (5).
Proposition 1 Let the pricing model of (1) hold for all security returns including the proxy return.
Consider (i) proportionality between the economic aggregate and the market return in (2)
and (ii) the measurable analog to the market model in (3) that is given by (5). Define
p =
E

rp;t



rp;t
 (9)
as the Sharpe performance measure for the proxy return, and
 =
Cov
et; rp;t
2

rp;t
 (10)
as a measure of the degree to which unobservable components to the market return covary
with the proxy return. Then,
d0 1e d  2p( 2   1) (11)
where
d = E [rt]  ( + )E

rp;t

:
The pricing model of (1) and (2) is not directly testable because rm;t is unobserved. With the
exception of , (11) is stated entirely in terms of quantities that are measurable from observed data,
provided, of course, that (5) can be identified. Proposition 1, therefore, derives a testable restriction
from (1) and (2) conditional on a prior belief about .
The proof of Proposition 1 in Appendix A demonstrates that
 =
p
 [mt]
:
Let m =
E[rm;t]
[rm;t]
; the Sharpe performance measure for the market return. Given (2),  [mt] = m,
and  is a ratio of Sharpe performance measures. As a consequence,  is afforded a geometric
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interpretation in mean-standard deviation space as the ratio of the slope of the security market
line passing through the excess proxy return to the slope of the security market line tangent to the
mean-variance frontier. This ratio links Proposition 1 to a test of relative efficiency for the proxy
return.
Let p =
Cov[rp;t; rt]
2[rp;t]
, the measurable analog to . Given (5),
p =  + : (12)
Proposition 1 provides a decomposition of these beta proxies into the true betas and the relation
between innovations to the measurable market model and the proxy return caused by measurement
error. Affording this decomposition is the structural interpretation of the measurable market model.
Given (12), d is the vector of constants from a linear multivariate regression of rt on rp;t or the
alphas measured with respect to the proxy return.5 Term these constants alpha proxies. Proposition
1 places an upper bound on these alpha proxies that is a function of the relative efficiency of the
proxy. The left-hand-side of (11) describes observable deviations from CAPM pricing. These
deviations need not be zero for the theory to hold because the proxy return not the market return
is being used in the restriction. However, these deviations are bounded by the proxy’s location in
mean-variance space. As  approaches one (i.e., the proxy approaches the mean-variance frontier),
these deviations approach zero. Let 0 be a prior belief on the true value of  (i.e., the true position
of the proxy relative to the mean-variance frontier). For a given d, et , and p, let  be the value
of  2 (0; 1] that, if it exists, satisfies (11). If  < 0, such is evidence against the pricing model
of (1) and (2). The strength of this evidence increases as   0 becomes more negative and is, of
course, conditional on the correctness of 0.
Corollary 1 In (4), suppose that t is constant such that t = c. Then (11) holds as an equality
to zero where d =  if and only if c = 0.
If t is constant, the market return is a mean-shift of the proxy return, and (5) is equivalent
to an OLS projection. Corollary 1 then relates the pricing restriction of (11) to a statement of
mean-variance efficiency similar to either Gibbons, Ross, and Shanken (1989) or MacKinlay and
5For a proof of this statement, see (46) and (47) in the Appendix.
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Richardson (1991) since each begins with the assertion that Cov et; rp;t = 0. From (44),  = 1
if and only if the mean-shift is identically zero. In this case
d0 1e d = 0;
which is equivalent to the null hypothesis
H0 :  = 0; c = 0; (13)
since
d = E [rt]  E

rp;t

=  + c (14)
given (5), (6) and the fact that  = 0.6 Failure to reject this null is a failure to reject equivalence
between the market and proxy return as well as mean-variance efficiency of the market return.
Rejection of this null, on the other hand, is only a rejection of mean-variance efficiency of the
proxy return, since either c 6= 0, in which case the proxy return is inefficient because  < 1, or
 6= 0, in which case the proxy and the market return are inefficient, or both. The inability to
distinguish between these alternatives illustrates the Roll (1977) critique.
If the market return is a mean-shift of the proxy return, the manner in which Proposition 1 al-
lows for an indirect assessment of the CAPM is parallel to that of Proposition 2 in Shanken (1987).
If, on the other hand, t 6= c, the structural equation in (5) no longer coincides with a projection
of rt onto rp;t. Diacogiannis and Feldman (2006) postulate that correlation between rp;t and t
"might be material when considering the misspecification caused by ignoring, in implementations
and tests, the addendum related to [t]" (p. 20). The following corollary confirms this hypothesis.
Corollary 2 Let ep;t be the errors from a linear multivariate projection of rt on rp;t, and define
ep as the variance-covariance matrix of these errors. Given (4), e ep is positive semi-
definite.
From Corollary 2, e  ep . By extension,  1ep   1e . Compare d0 1ep d to d0 1e d, noting
6From (14), d = 0 if  =  c. This latter equality is only satisfied under (13). To see why, note that  cannot
be a zero vector. Therefore, if  is nonzero, then c needs to be nonzero for the equality to hold. But, given (44) a
nonzero c means  < 1, which, in turn, means that d 6= 0 given (11).
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in both instances that d is a vector of alpha proxies. According to Corollary 2,
d0 1ep d  d0 1e d:
From (49), a case where these two quadratic forms equate is when t = c. In general, however,
the degree to which expected returns deviate from the CAPM prediction measured conditional
on a proxy return will tend to be overstated if  1ep is used as the weighting matrix as opposed
to  1e . As a consequence,  will tend to be understated in (11). The end result is that treating
the relationship between security returns and the proxy return as a projection equation instead of
a structural equation will bias test results of the inequality restriction in Proposition 1 towards
rejecting the CAPM theory.
Hansen and Jagannathan (1997) criticize model misspecification tests that depend on the variance-
covariance matrix of the pricing errors because these tests grant a "reward for sampling error asso-
ciated with the sampling mean." In reference to the CAPM, this paper argues that higher sampling
error should be accounted for to the extent that it relates to misspecification of the market return.
Ignoring this misspecification will bias the test results towards rejecting the theory because of the
proxy being used in the test not because of any failing in the theory itself.
Let p denote the vector of alpha proxies. If t = c, then from (14),
p =  + c: (15)
In this case, differences between the alpha proxies and the true alphas are directly proportional to
the mean-shift in the market return relative to the proxy return. These differences are expected to
be positive (negative) if  is positive (negative), since a negative mean-shift implies that  > 1
given (44). If t 6= c, then
p =  + E [t]  E

rp;t
 (16)
given (6) and (47). In this case, differences between the alpha proxies and the true alphas are
ambiguous. Affecting these differences are both the mean of the omitted components as well as
the covariance between those components and the proxy return. Provided that the CAPM holds,
(15) explains the empirical discovery of "significant" alpha measured with respect to a proxy return
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to be the result of the mismeasured portion to the market return. (16) adds to this explanation
covariation between this mismeasured portion and the proxy return.
3. Conventional Test
Suppose t = c in (4), and assume that et  N (0; e). Let bd and be = 1T TPbetbe0t
t=1
denote
estimates of p in (15) and e, respectively, from N separate OLS regressions of rit on rp;t, where
rit is the ith element of rt and t = 1; : : : ; T . bp is an estimate of the proxy performance measure
computed from the sample mean and variance of rp;t. Consider the following definitions:
Q  T
bd0b 1e bd
1 + b2p ;  
Td0 1e d
1 + b2p :
Gibbons, Ross, and Shanken (1989) show that [N 1 (T  N   1) =T   2]Q, conditional on rp;t,
is distributed as a noncentral F with degrees of freedom N and T   N   1 and non-centrality
parameter . Multiply both sides of (11) by T=

1 + b2p. Then Proposition 1 is equivalent to
H0 :  
T2p(
 2   1)
1 + b2p ; (17)
which establishes an upper-bound on the non-centrality parameter.
If  = 1, then  = 0, meaning that under Corollary 1, Q follows a central F distribution. In
this case, a test of (13) follows immediately because Q is stated entirely in terms of observable
quantities. Suppose, instead, that  < 1. Then, consider conducting a test of  >  conditional
on a value for p by evaluating (17) given  and p to obtain a value for  which, in turn, can be
used in the aforementioned noncentral F test. Shanken (1987) follows this approach. In addition,
for a given significance level , consider finding  such that the p-value from the non-central F test
equals . Then,  is the maximum correlation that satisfies Proposition 1 at a significance level of
 (for the empirical tests in section 6,  = 0:05). Following the discussion in section 2, whether
0 is greater than (less than)  then determines whether the CAPM is rejected (not rejected).
Violations of the normality assumption for et are well documented in the literature.7 Numer-
ous studies support Engle’s (1982) Autoregressive Conditional Heteroskedasticity (ARCH) and
7See Mandelbrot (1963) and Fama (1965) as early examples.
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Bollerslev’s (1986) Generalized ARCH (GARCH) in security returns. Common specifications of
these models assume et to be conditionally normal, which (as demonstrated by Milhoj (1985) or
Bollerslev (1986)) results in the unconditional distribution of et being leptokurtic; although, the
standardized residuals of et are still shown to be non-normal empirically. In light of these find-
ings, the potential for mean-variance efficiency tests like those just described to be sensitive to the
normality assumption motivated the search for more robust testing methods. From the results of
section 2, it is apparent that normality is not necessary for deriving data-dependent restrictions im-
plied by mean-variance efficiency (or relative efficiency). Rather, such a condition is statistically
convenient for determining the distributional properties of the resulting test statistics. With this
observation in mind, MacKinlay and Richardson (1991) proposed a GMM-based test that, by con-
struction, is distribution free and able to accommodate general forms of heteroskedasticity. These
authors uncovered material differences between their approach and that of Gibbons et al. (1989)
at conventional levels of significance.
A unifying restriction of both Gibbons et al. (1989) and MacKinlay and Richardson (1991)
is that t = c. Corollary 2 illustrates how a violation of this assumption could impact a test
of relative mean-variance efficiency. The testing methodology developed in the next section is
robust to t and is built upon the premise that et follows a GARCH process but one that is not ,
necessarily, conditionally normal.8
4. Econometric Methodology
An empirical investigation into Proposition 1 requires estimation of all quantities, with the
exception of , in (11). From the proof of Corollary 2, d is the vector of constant terms from
a multivariate projection of rt onto rp;t. As such, the individual elements of d can be estimated
following the same approach outlined in section 3. If t = c, then e = e and can also be
estimated in the manner described under section 3. If, on the other hand, t is stochastic, then
rp;t is endogenous to (5). Any method for estimating (5) and, hence, e needs to be robust to this
endogeneity.
8Diebold, Im, and Lee (1989) provide evidence that market model residuals are heteroskedastic.
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From (5), the relationship between any given security return and the proxy return can be ex-
pressed as
r1;t = 1;0 + 0rp;t + 1;t (18)
rp;t = 2;0 + 2;t; (19)
which is a triangular system without instruments, where r1t is a given security return and 1;t
and 2;t are unobserved errors or shocks. Let t =
h
1;t 2;t
i0
. The term 1;0 refers to the true
value of 1, with the same interpretation holding for all other parameter values. The sketch of an
identification result together for (18) and (19) with an associated estimator follows. Prono (2008)
provides a detailed discussion of both.
Note that (18) makes no explicit use of the error decomposition in (6), meaning that the effect
of t is considered only at the level of 1;t. No attempt is made to isolate or identify properties
unique to t. The functional form describing the relationship between 1;t and 2;t is sufficiently
general to place only minimal constraints on the process governing t.
Define St 1 as the -field generated by ft 1; t 2; : : :g, and assume
E

t j St 1

= 0; E
h
t
0
t j St 1
i
= Ht;
which is the definition of semi-strong GARCH from Drost and Nijman (1993). An advantage of
this definition is that no particular conditional distribution for t needs to be assigned. Let
vech (Ht) = ht; vech

t
0
t

= et;
and parameterize ht as
ht = C0 + A0et 1 +B0ht 1; (20)
where C0 is a 31 column vector andA0 andB0 are both 33 diagonal matrices. Throughout this
section, vech () denotes the matrix operator that stacks the lower triangle, including the diagonal,
of a symmetric matrix into a column vector, while vec () is the matrix operator that stacks the
columns of a matrix into a column vector. In addition, A =

ajk

denotes any matrix A.
(20) is a bivariate version of the familiar GARCH(p, q) model introduced by Bollerslev (1986).
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The special case of p = q = 1 is popular because of its parsimony and forecasting power. Exam-
ples of its use in the modeling of multivariate financial time series include Bollerslev, Engle, and
Wooldridge (1988) and Bollerslev (1990), where the former investigates a conditional CAPM. For
the purposes of identifying the triangular system, the GARCH model of (20) is the key identifying
assumption; in particular, the diagonal specification of the parameter matrices A0 and B0.
Ht needs to be positive definite almost surely. This requirement translates into restrictions on
the parameters cj1;0, ajk;0, and bjk;0 in (20). One way to satisfy this requirement (and the one relied
on in the empirical work of this paper) is to specify ht according to a bivariate diagonal BEKK(1,1)
model. The BEKK model is for general multivariate GARCH processes and is developed by Engle
and Kroner (1995).
Consider only the conditional covariance between 1;t and 2;t as well as the conditional vari-
ance of 2;t. In doing so, let et =
h
1;t2;t 
2
2;t
i0
, and define Zt 2 =

e
0
t 2    e0t L
0
for a finite
L  2. If et is covariance stationary (which requires 2;t to be fourth moment stationary), then the
conditional moment restrictions from (20) imply for the unconditional autocovariances of et that
Cov

et; Zt 2

=
 
A0 +B0

Cov

et; Zt 1

; (21)
where A0 is a 2  2 diagonal matrix formed from the elements a22;0 and a33;0 in A0 (a parallel
definition holds for B0), and Cov

et; Zt i
  E h(et   E [et])  Zt i   E [Zt]0i for i  1 (the
Lemma in Prono (2008) demonstrates this result).
For ARCH models (i.e., where B0 = 0), Rich, Raymond, and Butler (1991) realized that since
(20) implies
et = ht + !t;
where E

!t j St 1

= 0, then E

!te
0
t 1

= 0, thus enabling A0 to be identified by unconditional
moment restrictions familiar to the OLS and IV estimators. (21) is an extension of this result to the
GARCH(1,1) model.
Let Rt =
h
R1;t R2;t
i0
be the vector of reduced form errors from (18) and (19). The struc-
tural errors t are related to Rt by
t = 
 1
0 Rt; (22)
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where 0 =
24 1 0
0 1
35
. Given (22), substituting the reduced form expressions for 1;t2;t and 22;t
into (21) produces
Cov

rt; Zr;t 2

=
 
A0;r +B0;r

Cov

rt; Zr;t 1

;
where rt and Zr;t i (for i = 1; 2) are the reduced forms of et and Zt i, respectively, and A0;r and
B0;r are reduced form parameter matrices. While A0 and B0 are diagonal, A0;r and B0;r are upper
triangular. Furthermore, since dg
 
A0;r +B0;r

= A0 + B0, where dg () is the matrix operator
that forms a diagonal matrix from the principal diagonal of any matrix, the off-diagonal element of
A0;r +B0;r is a function of the diagonal elements and of 0. Therefore, if A0;r +B0;r is identified
(which it is if Cov rt; Zr;t 1 or, equivalently, Cov et; Zt 1 has a row rank of two), then this
parameter matrix defines a system of 3 reduced form equations in 3 structural unknowns (those
unknowns being a22;0, a33;0, and 0) with a unique solution for 0.
Iglesias and Phillips (2004) demonstrate that if the structural errors from a triangular sys-
tem follow a diagonal GARCH process, the reduced form errors, while still GARCH, are no
longer diagonal GARCH. The reduced form parameter matrices A0;r and B0;r both illustrate this
point and evidence how departures from diagonality permit identification. In particular, since
dg
 
A0;r +B0;r

= A0 + B0, the element in the upper triangle of A0;r + B0;r is restricted by the
diagonal terms. It is from this restriction that identification follows. In discussing how the rela-
tionship between structural and reduced form GARCH models can identify simultaneous systems,
Rigobon (2002) states "the model of heteroskedasticity of the structural residuals impose[s] im-
portant constraints on how the reduced form heteroskedasticity can evolve" (p.433). The relevant
constraint here is the exclusion of all off-diagonal terms in the formulation of ht in (20).
The traditional method for identifying the triangular system is to impose exclusion restrictions
on some of the exogenous variables affecting the conditional mean, which is equivalent to assuming
the existence of outside instruments. For the triangular system of (18) and (19), no such exclusions
are available. However, diagonality of the parameter matrices A0 and B0 in (20) is the extension of
exclusion restrictions onto the second moments. Without these restrictions, the triangular system
would remain unidentified, which is to say that the existence of conditional heteroskedasticity
alone is not sufficient for identification. For instance, suppose ht follows a fully general GARCH
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model, which requires A0 and B0 to be composed entirely of nonzero terms. Then the structural
form GARCH model imposes no constraints on how the reduced form can evolve. In this case, the
reduced form parameter matrix A0;r +B0;r defines a system of 4 equations in 5 unknowns.9
In the sketch of the identification result above, the conditional variance of 1;t plays no role.
Therefore, the parameterization of h11;t in (20) need not imply a finite fourth moment for 1;t as is
the requirement for h22;t in regards to 2;t.
Given the identification result, an estimator for (18) and (19) can be constructed from (21) and
the fact that E [t] = 0. Towards that end, let t =
h
1;t 2;t
i0
, and et =
h
1;t2;t 
2
2;t
i0
, where
1;t = r1;t   1   rp;t
2;t = rp;t   2
Define  = f1; 2; ; C; A + Bg, where C =
h
c21 c31
i0
and 	 as the set of all pos-
sible values for  . Let  =

I    A+B 1C, where I is the identity matrix, and zt 2 =h 
et 2   
0     et L   0i0 . Construct the sample moments
g1 = bE [t] ; g2 = bE [et]  ;
g3 =
dCov  et; zt 2    A+B dCov  et; zt 1 ;
where bE and dCov are estimates of the expectation and covariance operators, respectively, and stack
these moments into a single vector g =
h
g1 g2 vec (g3)
i0
. Given certain regulatory conditions,
the standard Hansen (1982) GMM estimator
b = arg min
 2	
g0WTg (23)
is weakly consistent for some sequence of positive definite WT . The choice of WT follows Prono
(2008) and is constructed such that the autocovariances in g3 are transformed into autocorrelations.
This transformation requires preliminary estimates of the variance to both 1;t2;t and 22;t.
Application of (23) to the N separate structural equations in the form of (18) that are implied
9Rigobon (2002) formalizes this result in an appendix.
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by (5) produces consistent estimates of the N elements in et, which can then be used to estimate
e. To close this section, bp = bE[rp;t]b22 .
5. Test Methodology
The inequality restriction in (11) is equivalent to
H0 :  
s
1
1 + 2pd
0 1e d (24)
which identifies an upper bound for , since  is strictly positive. Define  
q
1
1+2pd
0 1e d . Sec-
tion 4 outlines a methodology for obtaining b. An analogous approach to Shanken (1987) would
be to determine the distribution (either asymptotic or exact) of  so that a test of  >  could be
conducted. For a given significance level , the value of  that produces a p-value from that distri-
bution equal to  is then the maximum correlation supporting Proposition 1. A comparison of  to
0 determines whether the CAPM is rejected (not rejected) depending on whether the inequality is
< (>). Determining a distribution for , however, would be difficult, owing, in no small part, to
the heteroskedastic properties assumed for et that permit its identification. An alternative approach
would be to bootstrap a standard error for b and use this standard error to determine . This paper
adopts the alternative methodology.
Bootstrapping a standard error for b requires resampling from the N excess security returns
and the excess proxy return used to form the quantities bp, bd, and be. Such is a nontrivial exercise
since these returns are not iid and, in fact, their departure from independence (both within and
across return series) is a key assumption underlying the estimator that generates be. Define

(i)
t =
h
i;t e2;t
i0
; i = 1; : : : ; N;
where i;t = ri;t   i;0   i;0rp;t, the errors from the structural equation for the ith security return,
and e2;t is the demeaned proxy return. Suppose

(i)
t =

H
(i)
t
1=2
V
(i)
t ; (25)
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where H(i)t is the conditional variance-covariance matrix for the ith security return and the proxy
return parameterized according to (20), and V (i)t =
h
Vi;t Ve2;t
i0
. The vector V (i)t is assumed to be
iid with mean zero and identity variance-covariance matrix. (25) defines a strong GARCH process.
Unlike most applications of strong GARCH, however, no particular distribution is assumed for
V
(i)
t . The estimator in (23) supplies b(i)t . Conditional on this estimate, one can obtain bH(i)t . As a
result, bV (i)t =  bH(i)t  1=2b(i)t . Bootstrap samples are drawn from bV (i)t . Let bV (i)t be a bootstrap
sample. Then b(i)t =  bH(i)t 1=2 bV (i)t ;where bH(i)t is based upon parameter estimates from the
original sample, and brp;t = be2 +be2;t; (26)
bri;t = bi + bibrp;t +bi;t; i = 1; : : : ; N; (27)
where be2, bi, and bi are also obtained from the original sample. The resulting bootstrap series is
then used to estimate b given the estimation method described in section 4.
Define E as the expectation operator relative to the distribution of the bootstrap sample con-
ditional on the original sample, and let
g =
1
T
TX
t=1
gt:
Following Hall and Horowitz (1996), the bootstrap version of gt is
gt = gt   Ebgt; (28)
where bgt is gt evaluated at b , the parameter estimates from the original data sample. (28) recenters
the bootstrap moment conditions such that Egt = 0. In general, Egt 6= 0 when the number of
moment conditions exceeds the number of parameters in  . If gt is used instead of gt , then b  will
have different asymptotic properties than b . In order to avoid this discrepancy,
b  = arg min
 2	
g0W Tg
: (29)
The bootstrap standard error of b is based on b .
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Given a standard error for b, the asymptotic t statistic
b = b   bseb (30)
can be constructed to test b > . This statistic is asymptotically pivotal with an asymptotic dis-
tribution assumed to be well approximated by a standard normal.10 As a result, for  = 0:05, the
value of  can be determined such that  (b) = .
According to MacKinnon (2007), bootstrapping (30) will generally lead to an asymptotic re-
finement. Such a practice is referred to as the double or iterated bootstrap. Implementing the
double bootstrap, however, is very computationally expensive. For example, define B1 as the num-
ber of bootstrap iterations used to generate bseb and B2 as the number of iterations used to
generate the bootstrap distribution of (30). If B1 = B2 = 1000, then the total number of iterations
required for the double bootstrap is approximately 1 million. Given the size of the data samples
used to construct b (see section 6), the standard normal will likely provide a descent approximation
to the asymptotic distribution of (30). A Monte Carlo study (see section 7) verifies this claim. As
a result, this approximation is used as opposed to the double bootstrap alternative.
6. Test Results
All tests are conducted using size, B/M, and momentum portfolios. These portfolios are studied
because they reflect the size, value, and momentum "premiums" that empirical applications of the
CAPM struggle to explain. The returns are measured weekly (in percentage terms) from 10/6/67
through 9/28/07. Test results consider 20- and 10-year subperiods of this overall date range. The
daily 25 size-B/M and 25 size-momentum return files (each 55 sorts with breakpoints determined
by NYSE quintiles) formed from all securities traded on the NYSE, AMEX, and NASDAQ ex-
changes are used to construct the weekly return series.11 Monte Carlo studies of (23) reveal sizable
benefits in terms of reduced finite sample bias and increased efficiency from using large sample
sizes due to the fact that higher moments are being estimated. In light of this finding, weekly
10From MacKinnon (2007), "a test statistic is asymptotically pivotal if its asymptotic distribution does not depend
on anything that is unknown" (p.5).
11These return files are available on Kenneth French’s website.
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returns are utilized. Further supporting this frequency choice is the fact that weekly returns reduce
day-of-the-week and weekend effects as well as the effects of nonsynchronus trading and bid-ask
bounce. The size portfolios considered are "Small," "Mid," and "Large." "Small" is the average
of the five low-market-cap portfolios, "Mid" the average of the five medium-market-cap portfo-
lios, and "Big" the average of the five large-market-cap portfolios. The B/M portfolios considered
are "Value," Neutral," and "Growth." Value" is the average of the five high-B/M portfolios, "Neu-
tral" the average of the five middle-B/M portfolios, and "Growth" the average of the five low-B/M
portfolios.12 Finally, the momentum portfolios considered are "Losers," "Draws," and "Winners."
"Losers" is the average of the five low-return-sorted portfolios, "Neutral" the average of the five
middle-return sorted portfolios, and "Winners" the average of the five high-return-sorted portfo-
lios. The proxy return is the CRSP value-weighted index return formed from all securities traded
on the NYSE, AMEX, and NASDAQ exchanges. The risk-free rate is the one-month Treasury bill
rate from Ibbotson Associates.
The tests focus on (17) and (24). The former is conducted following the approach developed in
Gibbons, Ross, and Shanken (1989), referred to hereafter as GRS, that is implemented in Shanken
(1987) described in section 3. The latter is conducted following the approach of section 5 under
two cases: (1) t = c, (2) t is stochastic. Case 1 will be referred to as Bootstrap Proposition
1 constant (BPC), while case 2 will be referred to as Bootstrap Proposition 1 stochastic (BPS).
The only difference in implementation between BPC and BPS is that under the former, OLS re-
gressions estimate the measurable market model while, under the latter, this model is estimated
using (23) and its bootstrap analog in (29). A comparison of BPC to GRS evidences the effects of
conditional heteroskedasticity on a test of relative mean-variance efficiency. A comparison of BPC
to BPS evidences the effects of treating the market model as a projection as opposed to a structural
equation. When implementing BPS, the number of lags used in (23) is set to L = 4. The choice of
this lag length is motivated by the frequency of returns as well as the finding in Prono (2008) that
higher lag lengths, while successful at reducing the variability of b also increases the finite sample
bias. Finally, all bootstrap routines are conducted over 1000 trials.
Table 1 (A and B) and 2 (A and B) summarizes results from two 20-year subperiods: (1) 10/6/67
- 9/25/87, (2) 11/6/87 - 9/28/07. Tables 1A and 2A provide summary statistics of the returns used
12Definitions for the "Small," "Large," "Value," and "Growth" portfolios are taken from Lewellen and Nagel (2006).
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in the tests as well as the alpha proxies (accompanied with heteroskedasticity-corrected standard
errors) from individual OLS regressions of those returns on the proxy. Tables 1B and 2B describe
the maximum correlation between the proxy return and the market return that still supports the
CAPM result at a 5% significance level according to the GRS, BPC, and BPS tests. Recall that all
three tests are based on the inequality restriction in (11). If  < 1, then a test of this restriction
requires a prior belief on the true value of the correlation 0. From Roll (1977), 0 = 0:90 or
above. This value will be used throughout the discussions of the test results.
For the GRS test, if  < 1, then a test of (17) also requires the true value of p. Possible
values for p are taken from Shanken (1987). p = 0:52 is the most likely (or expected) value.
p = 0:22 and p = 0:86 are - 1 standard deviations and + 2 standard deviations away from this
expected value, respectively. All values of p are annualized for presentation but expressed in
weekly terms when used in the tests. Assuming an annual standard deviation of 20% for the proxy
return, p = 0:22 corresponds to a "market" premium of 4.4%, p = 0:52 a "market" premium
of 10.4%, and p = 0:86 a "market" premium of 17.2%.13 This range for p is sufficiently wide
to encompass the point estimates for p implied by the different subperiods considered. Finally,
p = 1:00 is also reported as a value for the proxy Sharpe ratio that is greater than any conceivable
true value.
Since (17) requires p to be known, for comparative purposes p is treated as known in (24)
for the BPC and BPS tests. In addition, however, p is also treated as unknown in the latter two
tests, meaning that its value is bootstrapped along with every other random quantity in b. In the
tables, the heading "unknown" under Panel F: BPC and Panel G: BPS details the results of this
more general treatment.
Under Tables 1B and 2B, note that (1) the projection errors appear to be non-normal, char-
acterized by (at times) significant skewness and (often times) excess kurtosis, and (2) there exist
apparent differences between the projection and structural errors. These two findings foreshadow
differences between the GRS, BPC, and BPS tests. Also under Tables 1B and 2B, a comparison
of the maximum correlations for known values of p between the GRS and BPC tests reveals the
general tendency of higher correlations implied by the former. Such a tendency implies that the
former test will tend to under-reject the CAPM relative to the latter. MacKinlay and Richardson
13By "market" premium, what is meant is the market premium implied by the proxy.
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(1991) document a similar finding in their empirical work. As an example, for the period 10/6/67
- 9/25/87 at p = 0:52,  = 0:86 according to GRS but  = 0:74 according to BPC for the size
portfolios. For the period 11/6/87 - 9/28/07, the same comparison yields  = 1:00 according to
GRS as opposed to  = 0:93 according to BPC. This latter comparison possesses economic sig-
nificance since the former cannot reject mean-variance efficiency of the proxy (see Corollary 1),
while the latter can. When comparing GRS and BPC across the two 20-year time periods, the
largest differences in relative efficiency occur for the size portfolios. The B/M portfolios show a
similar directional difference, though on a more muted scale. For both 20-year time periods, the
maximum correlations measured relative to the momentum portfolios are higher for BPC than for
GRS. The difference between these correlations, however, is small.
A comparison of the maximum correlations for constant values of p between the BPC and
BPS tests supports the results of Corollary 2. These correlations are generally higher under the
latter. The largest correlation difference between BPC and BPS occurs for the size portfolios in
the second 20-year time period for p = 0:22. In this case,  = 0:64 under BPC, while  = 0:86
under BPS. Also in the second 20-year period, positive correlation differences between the BPS
and BPC tests are apparent across all values of p for the B/M and momentum portfolios.
Treating p as unknown under BPS offers the most general test considered and is the principal
contribution of this paper to relative efficiency testing. In contrast, the GRS method requires p
to be known. The most natural means of comparison between GRS and BPS with an unknown
p is to assume that p = bp (the sample-specific estimate of p) for the former, since bp is the
point estimate around which bootstrap samples are generated. For the first 20-year time period,bp = 0:22 while for the second, bp  0:52. In the second 20-year time period, therefore,  =
0:54 under GRS as compared to  = 0:75 under BPS for the momentum portfolios. The former
result implies that the proxy return explains less than 30% of the variation in the market return
(0:542 = 0:29), while the latter implies that the proxy return accounts for over 55% of the variation
in the market return. In this case, GRS rather significantly understates the relative efficiency of the
proxy return when compared to BPS. An inference from this result is that the GRS test will tend
to over-reject the CAPM prediction. Understatement of the relative efficiency of the proxy return
by GRS when compared to BPS (with an unknown p) is consistent across both time periods and
for all portfolios considered. The difference in the implied mean-variance location of the proxy
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portfolio can be striking. For instance,  is 59% and 64% higher according to BPS when compared
to GRS for the B/M and momentum portfolios, respectively, in the first 20-year time period.
The BPS test with an unknown p cannot reject the null hypothesis that the proxy return is
mean-variance efficient for size portfolios in the most-recent 20-year period. Otherwise, the test
results do not speak favorably for the CAPM. If 0 = 0:90, then the result of Proposition 1 is re-
jected for all remaining time periods and portfolios. The CAPM fares decidedly worse on B/M and
momentum portfolios relative to size portfolios and performs the poorest on momentum portfolios.
A potential bright-spot emerges when comparing results between the two time periods. The size
of the CAPM errors for all the portfolios considered is greatly reduced in the most-recent period,
since the implied correlations very nearly double. This paper, therefore, documents a significant
increase in the ability of the CAPM to explain the size, value, and momentum "premiums" post the
1987 market crash.
As a robustness check, the GRS, BPC, and BPS tests are also applied to three 10-year subpe-
riods: (1) 10/7/77 - 9/25/87, (2) 11/6/87 - 9/26/97, (3) 10/3/97 - 9/28/07.14 Tables 3 (A and B)
through 5 (A and B) summarize the results. These results are largely consistent with those for the
two 20-year subperiods discussed above. Namely, for constant values of p, GRS tends to imply
higher correlations than BPC, and BPC tends to imply lower correlations than BPS. In addition,
GRS when evaluated at p = bp tends to imply lower correlations than BPS evaluated with an
unknown p. Moreover, significant differences between the tests continue to be evidenced. For
example, during the period 11/6/87 - 9/26/97, the GRS test rejects the CAPM prediction at all
levels of p for the B/M portfolios. The BPS test with an unknown p, on the other hand, does not.
During the period 10/3/97 - 9/28/07, also for the B/M portfolios, the GRS test fails to reject the
CAPM at all levels of p, while the BPS test with an unknown p offers a sound rejection.
7. Monte Carlo
The previous section establishes that inferences on the relative efficiency of a given proxy
return can be sensitive to the test considered. This section investigates the source of these differ-
ences. For instance, do these differences signal the inappropriateness of a normality assumption
14The period 10/6/67 - 9/30/77 is not considered because the mean of the proxy return is negative.
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for innovations to the market model? Do they signal the inappropriateness of treating the market
model as a projection? Alternatively, do they reflect poor finite sample performance of the GMM
estimator in (23) or the fact that the asymptotic distribution of the test statistic in (30) is not well
approximated by a standard normal?
In order to assess these possibilities, consider a Monte Carlo study of the following design.
From (25), with N = 3 let the individual components of V (i)t be distributed as standardized
Gamma(2,1) random variables, and parameterize H(i)t using the estimates obtained for the B/M
portfolios over the period 11/6/87 - 9/28/07 that do not assume h
ie2;t = 0.15 Further, let be2 andbi from (26) and (27), respectively, be obtained from (23) applied to the same data set mentioned
above. Consider the pricing restriction of (11) stated in terms of estimated quantities. Conditional
on bH(i)t , be2, and bi, bi in (27) is set so that the individual components of bd are equal and support
 = 0:90.16 Therefore, the data generating process (DGP) considered in this study supports the
CAPM.
Given the DGP described above, this study examines the rejection rates of the GRS, BPC, and
BPS tests at 10%, 5%, and 1% significance levels when either  or  is set equal to 0:90. For the
GRS test, p is assumed to be known and is set equal to the estimate from the original sample.
For the BPC and BPS tests, p is treated as unknown. For all three test statistics, simulations are
conducted across 500 trials generating excess return series of 1000 observations each. When con-
structing the individual excess return series for each trial, the first 200 observations are dropped to
avoid initialization effects. For the BPC and BPS statistics, within each simulation trial a bootstrap
of b is conducted over 250 repetitions.17 Parameter estimates for implementing these routines do
not vary by simulation trial. These parameter estimates are generated from the original data sample
15The Gamma(2,1) distribution is chosen because, when combined with bH(i)t , this distribution produces errors with
unconditional skewness and kurtosis measures comparable to those described under Panel D for the B/M portfolios of
Table 2B.
16From (47), bi = bdi + bi bE rp;t :
Let bdi = bdj 8 i; j = 1; 2; 3. From the B/M portfolios and proxy return measured over the period 11/6/87 - 9/28/07, bdi
is calibrated such that  = 0:90 if (11) is treated as an equality. bi is the slope parameter from an OLS regression ofbi;t on rp;t.
17The test results bootstrap b for 1000 repetitions. Only 250 repetitions are considered here in order to keep the
simulation time feasible. This truncated number of repetitions should still produce a decent estimate of the standard
error.
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in the manner described above, although in the case of the BPC statistic, the additional constraint
of h
ie2;t = 0 is imposed.
Table 6 reports the simulation results. Both the GRS and BPC statistics over-reject the null
hypothesis that  is at least 0:90 or, equivalently, that the CAPM holds. Across the size levels
considered, the GRS statistic over-rejects more than does the BPC statistic. Simulation studies of
Zhou (1993) and Chou (1996) show that the GRS statistic tends to over-reject the null hypothesis
of an efficient proxy return (i.e., that  = 1) when the distribution of the errors to the market model
is non-elliptical.18 The results presented here compliment those of Zhou (1993) and Chou (1996)
by showing that the tendency for GRS to over-reject extends to tests of relative efficiency where
temporal dependence is a factor governing the non-elliptical nature of the error distributions.
In general, the BPS statistic is appropriately sized. A tendency for under-rejecting the null
hypothesis is evident at the 10% significance level, but this tendency is modest and is no larger
in absolute value than the size distortions evidenced by the other two tests.19 No such tendency
(in either direction) is meaningfully evidenced at either the 5% or 1% significance levels. As a
result, it does not appear that poor finite sample performance of the GMM estimator and/or poor
approximation of the asymptotic distribution of the test statistic by a standard normal meaningfully
distorts the size of the BPS test. In addition, results from the BPC and BPS tests support the finding
of Corollary 2 that treating the market model as a linear projection leads to an over-rejection of
the CAPM in cases where t 6= c. Finally, from Table 2B, note that the maximum correlations
determined by the GRS, BPC, and BPS statistics are 0:73, 0:824, and 0:841, respectively.20 The
rank order of these maximum correlations is supported by the simulation results.
8. Extension
This section generalizes Proposition 1 in terms of conditional moment restrictions and, in doing
so, links mismeasurement of the market return to time-variation in "beta." In order to develop this
generalization, define It 1 as the information set containing past histories of rt, rp;t, and xt, a vector
18The method proposed by Zhou (1993) requires the error distributions to be specified, while Chou (1996) utilizes
a bootstrap approach, but one where temporal independence is assumed.
19Chou (1996) reports similar size distortions at a 10% level for bootstrap tests of mean-variance efficiency.
20For the GRS test, p = bp = 0:52. For both the BPC and BPS tests, p is unknown.
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of forecasting instruments. Moments for period t conditional on It 1 are labeled with a t subscript
as are parameters conditional on It 1. Consider a conditional version of the pricing model in (1)
Et [rt] = Covt [mt; rt] ; (31)
where
mt =
 
Et

rm;t

2t

rm;t
! rm;t: (32)
(31) and (32) imply a conditional CAPM.21 In addition, assume
 =
Covt

rm;t; rt

2t

rm;t
 (33)
so that the true betas are constant parameters and time variation in expected security returns is
driven by changes in the market risk premium. Ferson (1990) asserts that the specification of
constant betas "is an important assumption in the context of models with conditional expectations"
(p.399).22
Consider the following generalization of the measurable market model in (5)
rt = t + rp;t + et; (34)
where
t =  + Et [t] ;
et = t   Et [t] :
and  as well as et retain their definitions from (6). A case for Cov et; rp;t 6= 0 follows the
same logic outlined in section 2. (34) affords a general specification for the time-varying mean of
security returns.23 This time variation is linked to time variation in the expected proxy return as
21Harvey (1989), Bodurtha and Mark (1991), Jagannathan and Wang (1996), Lettau and Ludvigson (2001), Adrian
and Franzoni (2004), and Ang and Chen (2007) all consider versions of the CAPM in this form.
22In nearly all cases, a conditionally mean-variance efficient portfolio will exist, implying that so too will a single
beta model for expected returns. In general, the beta from this model will be time-varying.
23There is a consensus in the literature that expected returns are time-varying conditional on a set of forecasting
instruments. Potential instruments include (i) lagged values of the proxy return to capture reversion as evidenced in
Keim and Stambaugh (1986) and Fama and French (1989) among others, (ii) the term spread as measured by the
difference between the 10-year and 3-month yields and advocated by Fama and French (1989), (iii) Moody’s BAA -
AAA credit spread (see, e.g, Campbell (1996), and (iv) the value spread as measured by the return difference between
26
well as the expected value of the components omitted from that proxy return. In the special case
where the market return is a mean-shift of the proxy return, the single source of time variation in
expected returns is time variation in the expected proxy return.
In order to relate the economic aggregate to observable variables, consider the linear projection
of mt onto rp;t conditional on It 1
mt = a+ btrp;t + em;t; (35)
where
bt =
Covt

rp;t; mt

2t

rp;t
 :
A straightforward adaptation of the Lemma in the Appendix to conditional moments grants
Covt
et; em;t0 1et Covt et; em;t  2t [mt]  1  2t  ; (36)
where  1et is the variance-covariance matrix of residuals from (34) conditional on It 1, and t is
the conditional correlation between mt and rp;t. Given (36), a conditional analog to Proposition 1
may be stated as
Proposition 2 Let the pricing model of (31) hold for all security returns including the proxy return.
Consider (i) proportionality between the economic aggregate and the market return in (32)
and (ii) the generalization of the measurable market model given by (34). Define
p;t =
Et

rp;t

t

rp;t

as the conditional Sharpe performance measure for the proxy return, and
t =
Covt
et; rp;t
2t

rp;t
 :
as a conditional measure of the degree to which unobservable components to the market
return covary with the proxy return. Assume that the relative efficiency of the proxy return is
value and growth stocks (see Campbell and Vuolteenaho (2004)).
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constant. Then,
d0 1et d  2p;t( 2   1) (37)
where
d = Et [rt]  ( + t)Et

rp;t

:
Proof. See the proof of Proposition 1 in the Appendix, and condition the moments contained
therein on It 1. Let m;t =
Et[rm;t]
t[rm;t]
. Given (32) and the fact that (31) also holds for rp;t,
t =
Covt

mt; rp;t

t [mt]t

rp;t
 = p;t
m;t
;
which is constant by assumption.
The deviation vector d from Proposition 2 is a N -vector of constant terms from the following
model for rt:
rt = d+ ( + t)Et

rp;t

+ ut (38)
where Et [ut] = 0.24 Let p;t =
Covt[rt; rp;t]
2t [rp;t]
. Given (34),
p;t =  + t: (39)
As a result, d is a vector of deviations from conditional CAPM pricing measured with respect to the
proxy return, where both the beta proxies and the expected "market" premium are time-varying.
From (39), time-variation in the beta proxies results from mismeasuring the market return, since
in the true model, betas are constant. Proposition 2 establishes an upper bound for these pricing
errors based on the location of the proxy return relative to the conditional mean-variance frontier.
Like its unconditional counterpart, a principal strength of Proposition 2 is that except for , it is
stated entirely in terms of quantities that can be directly estimated from observable data. This
proposition, therefore, sets up a test of the conditional CAPM based upon a prior belief of the
proxy’s relative efficiency.
Suppose the market return is a mean-shift of the proxy return. Then (34) is a projection of rt
24(38) is a vector statement of (4) in Bodurtha and Mark (1991).
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onto rp;t, and the beta proxies are not time varying since t = 0. In this case, time variation in
expected security returns is the result of a time-varying "market" premium.
Works by Harvey (1989), Bodurtha and Mark (1991), and more recently Adrian and Franzoni
(2004) and Ang and Chen (2007) consider time-varying betas for the CAPM. Adrian and Fran-
zoni (2004) and Ang and Chen (2007) stress time-varying betas as meaningful contributors to the
improved performance of conditional specifications of the CAPM relative to their unconditional
counterparts. All of these works measure time-variation in beta proxies. The findings of these au-
thors, therefore, may be interpreted as evidence supporting the significance of measurement error
on the outcomes of proxy-based investigations into the CAPM prediction.
Given (37), the conditional analog to (24) is
H0 :   t;
where t 
r
1
1+2p;td
0 1et d . Taking expectations of both sides produces a null hypothesis testable
following the same methodology outlined in section 5, with an asymptotic t statistic
b c = bE [t]  bse bE [t] :
To render this test feasible, the vector of forecasting instruments xt needs to be specified as does
the manner in which It 1 conditions security returns and the "market" premium. In addition, the
estimator employed for (34) needs to separately treat the conditional covariance and conditional
variance operators that define t, so that the time series of this measure can be recovered.
9. Conclusion
This paper develops a new test of the CAPM that accounts for a proxy’s mismeasurement of the
market return both in terms of the former’s relation to the latter as well as the former’s relation to
the assets it is assumed to price. For a given collection of test assets, conventional investigations of
the CAPM prediction based upon the relative mean-variance efficiency of a given proxy estimate
the market model by a linear projection. This paper demonstrates that estimating this projection
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is not without loss of generality. The returns to nontraded assets and the returns to human capital
are omitted from common "market"-based proxies. The extent to which these returns correlate
with a given proxy will determine the extent to which innovations to the measurable market model
covary with the proxy return. The resulting structural equation will necessarily differ from the
projection equation. A novel estimator for this structural equation is reviewed that does not require
outside instruments. This estimator is then used to show that the proposed test of relative mean-
variance efficiency built upon the structural equation differs in economically significant ways from
competing tests based upon the projection equation. In particular, the competing tests over-reject
the CAPM prediction because these tests ignore the effects of omitted components from the market
return on the measurable market model.
An extension of the pricing restriction implied by a mismeasured market return to conditional
moments separates the beta measured with respect to a proxy return into a constant and a time-
varying component. Time-variation in the second component is sourced to mismeasurement of
the market return. Estimating this time-variation is central to evaluating the performance of a
conditional CAPM where movements in beta significant to the pricing of expected returns are
caused by measurement error. The estimator described in section 4 treats the parameters governing
the conditional covariance matrix as nuisance parameters and only estimates composite functions
of these parameters. Given the specification of t in Proposition 2, a complete treatment of the
conditional covariance between the market model residuals and the proxy return as well as the
conditional variance of the proxy return is necessary to render the result of Proposition 2 testable.
Future research could develop such an estimator. The performance of the conditional pricing
restriction in Proposition 2 could then be compared against the unconditional pricing restriction
of Proposition 1 and alternative pricing models like the three-factor model of Fama and French
(1993).
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Appendix
Lemma Consider the structural model in (5) and the linear projection in (7). Then
Cov
et; em;t0 1e Cov et; em;t  2 [mt]  1  2
where e is the N  N covariance matrix of et, and  is the correlation between mt and
rp;t.
Proof. Since (7) describes a linear projection of mt onto rp;t, b = Cov[rp;t; mt]2[rp;t] and 
2

em;t

=
2 [mt] (1  2). Consider regressing em;t on et. The explained variance from that regression is
Cov
et; em;t0 1e Cov et; em;t, which cannot be greater than 2 [mt] (1  2), the total variance
of em;t.
Proof of Proposition 1 Substitution of (5) into the right-hand-side of (1) produces
Cov [rt; mt] = Cov

rp;t; mt

+ Cov [et;mt] : (40)
Given (7),
Cov [et; mt] =
 
Cov
et; rp;t
2

rp;t
 !Cov rp;t; mt+ Cov et; em;t : (41)
Combining (40) and (41) produces
Cov [rt; mt] = ( + )Cov

rp;t; mt

+ Cov
et; em;t ;
where  is defined in (10). Given (1) and (8), it follows that
d0 1e d  2 [mt]  1  2 (42)
where
d = E [rt]  ( + )E

rp;t

;
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since (1) holds for both rt and rp;t. Also since (1) holds for rp;t,
 =
Cov

mt; rp;t

 [mt]

rp;t
 = p
 [mt]
; (43)
which equates (11) with (42).
Proof of Corollary 1 Given (2) and (43),  = p
m
. Substituting (4) into this result with the con-
straint that t = c produces
 =
E

rp;t

c + E

rp;t
 ; (44)
from which follows the statement that  = 1 if and only if c = 0. If  = 1, then d0 1et d = 0
in (11). Since c = 0,  = 0 in (10), and d = Et [rt]  Et

rp;t

. From (5) then follows that
d = .
Proof of Corollary 2 Let
rt = p + prp;t + ep;t (45)
be a multivariate linear projection of rt onto rp;t, where p is a vector of alpha proxies, p is
a vector of beta proxies, and ep;t is a vector of projection errors. Then
p = E [rt]  pE

rp;t
 (46)
p =
Cov

rt; rp;t

2

rp;t

Substitution of (5) into the expression for p yields the following relationships between the
parameters in (45) and the structural parameters in (5):
p =    E

rp;t
 (47)
p =  + 
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where  is defined by (10). Given these relationships,
ep;t = rt   p   prp;t = et   erp;t
where erp;t = rp;t   E rp;t. It then follows that
ep = e  Cov
et; erp;tCov et; erp;t0
2
erp;t ; (48)
since given the definition of erp;t, Cov et; rp;t = Cov et; erp;t and 2 rp;t = 2 erp;t.
Substitution of the expression for et in (6) into (48) produces
e  ep =
0@Cov
het; erp;ti

erp;t
1A2 0: (49)
In general, there exists an x such that 0x = 0. Let y = 0x. Then y0y  0.
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Table 1A
Summary statistics for size, B/M, and momentum portfolios, 10/6/67 - 9/25/87. The portfolio return series are measured
weekly (in percentage terms) so that relatively high frequency data is utilized (to estimate higher moments) that reduces day-
of-the-week and weekend effects as well as the effects of nonsynchronus trading and bid-ask bounce. The proxy return is
the CRSP market-value-weighted index of all securities on the NYSE, AMEX, and NASDAQ exchanges. Security returns are
constructed from the 25 size-B/M portfolios and the 25 size-momentum portfolios (each 55 sorts with breakpoints determined
by NYSE quintiles). "Small" is the average of the five low-market-cap portfolios, "Mid" the average of the five medium-market-
cap portfolios, and "Big" the average of the five large-market-cap portfolios. "Value" is the average of the five high-B/M portfolios,
"Neutral" the average of the five middle-B/M portfolios, and "Growth" the average of the five low-B/M portfolios. Finally,
"Losers" is the average of the five low-return-sorted portfolios, "Neutral" the average of the five middle-return-sorted portfolios,
and "Winners" the average of the five high-return-sorted portfolios.
Size B/M Momentum
Small Mid Large Value Neutral Growth Losers Draws Growth
Panel A: Excess returns
mean 0.103 0.120 0.075 0.169 0.108 0.023 -0.034 0.101 0.198
stdev 2.31 2.14 2.03 2.08 1.96 2.64 2.72 1.99 2.44
skew -0.33 -0.20 0.11 -0.21 -0.18 -0.19 0.32 -0.10 -0.58
kurt 5.12 4.80 4.83 5.18 4.70 4.71 5.84 5.22 4.95
Panel B: Alpha Proxy
est 0.045 0.060 0.016 0.113 0.053 -0.053 -0.106 0.045 0.132
std errora 0.039 0.024 0.012 0.028 0.021 0.025 0.038 0.020 0.031
Notes:
aHeteroskedasticity consistent
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Table 1B
Test results for size, B/M, and momentum portfolios, 10/6/67 - 9/25/87. Projection errors are the residuals from OLS
regressions of security returns on the proxy return. Structural errors are the residuals from linear equations relating security returns
to the proxy return, where the residual from each equation and the proxy return is allowed to covary. Gibbons, Ross, and Shanken
(1989), or GRS, Bootstrap Proposition 1 constant covariance (BPC), and Bootstrap Proposition 1 stochastic (BPS), are alternative
ways of determining the maximum correlation between the CRSP value-weighted proxy return and the market return that supports
the CAPM at a 5% significance level. GRS is based on the assumption that the projection errors are normally distributed. BPC is
also based on the projection errors, but assumes those errors to follow strong, univariate GARCH(1,1) processes with unknown
distributions. BPS is based on the assumption that the structural errors follow strong, univariate GARCH (1,1) processes with
unknown distributions.
Size B/M Momentum
Small Mid Large Value Neutral Growth Losers Draws Winners
Panel C: Projection errors
skew 0.23 0.22 0.09 0.39 0.48 0.11 0.98 0.39 -0.70
kurt 5.08 5.85 4.15 5.76 8.19 4.45 7.95 5.32 6.83
Panel D: Structural errors
skew 0.17 0.23 0.00 0.40 0.47 0.10 0.59 0.30 -0.85
kurt 5.67 5.81 5.68 5.99 8.15 4.41 5.97 4.99 6.89
Panel E: GRSb, c
Proxy Sharpe ratio:
0.22 0.565 0.277 0.236
0.52 0.855 0.570 0.504
0.86 0.939 0.753 0.694
1.00 0.953 0.800 0.746
Panel F: BPCb, c
Proxy Sharpe ratio:
0.22 0.410 0.272 0.260
0.52 0.737 0.551 0.530
0.86 0.892 0.737 0.715
1.00 0.924 0.787 0.766
unknown 0.581 0.429 0.398
Panel G: BPSb, c
Proxy Sharpe ratio:
0.22 0.409 0.271 0.242
0.52 0.741 0.552 0.511
0.86 0.896 0.738 0.706
1.00 0.927 0.787 0.761
unknown 0.590 0.440 0.388
Notes:
bMaximum correlations are reported that support the CAPM prediction.
cValues for the proxy Sharpe ratio are taken from Shanken (1987). These values are annualized. 0.52 is the expected value;
0.22 and 0.86 are - 1 and + 2 standard deviations away from this expected value, respectively. 1.00 is a value for the proxy
Sharpe ratio that is greater than any conceivable true value. Unknown means that the proxy Sharpe ratio is bootstrapped along
with every other estimated quantity in the expression determining an upper bound for the correlation between the proxy and the
market return.
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Table 2A
Summary statistics for size, B/M, and momentum portfolios, 11/6/87 - 9/28/07. The portfolio return series are measured
weekly (in percentage terms) so that relatively high frequency data is utilized (to estimate higher moments) that reduces day-
of-the-week and weekend effects as well as the effects of nonsynchronus trading and bid-ask bounce. The proxy return is
the CRSP market-value-weighted index of all securities on the NYSE, AMEX, and NASDAQ exchanges. Security returns are
constructed from the 25 size-B/M portfolios and the 25 size-momentum portfolios (each 55 sorts with breakpoints determined
by NYSE quintiles). "Small" is the average of the five low-market-cap portfolios, "Mid" the average of the five medium-market-
cap portfolios, and "Big" the average of the five large-market-cap portfolios. "Value" is the average of the five high-B/M portfolios,
"Neutral" the average of the five middle-B/M portfolios, and "Growth" the average of the five low-B/M portfolios. Finally,
"Losers" is the average of the five low-return-sorted portfolios, "Neutral" the average of the five middle-return-sorted portfolios,
and "Winners" the average of the five high-return-sorted portfolios.
Size B/M Momentum
Small Mid Large Value Neutral Growth Losers Draws Growth
Panel A: Excess returns
mean 0.169 0.176 0.157 0.209 0.183 0.103 0.041 0.172 0.315
stdev 2.16 2.09 1.92 1.88 1.83 2.61 2.94 1.74 2.60
skew -1.04 -0.64 -0.29 -0.91 -0.75 -0.75 0.03 -0.60 -0.89
kurt 11.76 6.64 4.97 9.24 6.66 9.05 7.00 6.72 10.96
Panel B: Alpha Proxy
est 0.049 0.040 0.027 0.094 0.063 -0.070 -0.129 0.059 0.148
std errora 0.044 0.029 0.023 0.032 0.025 0.034 0.056 0.025 0.039
Notes:
aHeteroskedasticity consistent
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Table 2B
Test results for size, B/M, and momentum portfolios, 11/6/87 - 9/28/07. Projection errors are the residuals from OLS
regressions of security returns on the proxy return. Structural errors are the residuals from linear equations relating security returns
to the proxy return, where the residual from each equation and the proxy return is allowed to covary. Gibbons, Ross, and Shanken
(1989), or GRS, Bootstrap Proposition 1 constant covariance (BPC), and Bootstrap Proposition 1 stochastic (BPS), are alternative
ways of determining the maximum correlation between the CRSP value-weighted proxy return and the market return that supports
the CAPM at a 5% significance level. GRS is based on the assumption that the projection errors are normally distributed. BPC is
also based on the projection errors, but assumes those errors to follow strong, univariate GARCH(1,1) processes with unknown
distributions. BPS is based on the assumption that the structural errors follow strong, univariate GARCH (1,1) processes with
unknown distributions.
Size B/M Momentum
Small Mid Large Value Neutral Growth Losers Draws Winners
Panel C: Projection errors
skew -0.04 0.14 1.41 -0.08 0.17 -0.07 1.13 0.89 -0.25
kurt 7.56 6.06 19.54 6.68 6.70 7.71 9.22 11.49 6.83
Panel D: Structural errors
skew -0.43 -0.33 -0.07 -0.75 -0.63 -0.28 1.07 -0.36 -0.72
kurt 9.72 6.68 5.05 10.20 6.59 8.36 9.24 7.39 10.96
Panel E: GRSb, c
Proxy Sharpe ratio:
0.22 1.000 0.406 0.258
0.52 1.000 0.730 0.540
0.86 1.000 0.870 0.727
1.00 1.000 0.899 0.776
Panel F: BPCb, c
Proxy Sharpe ratio:
0.22 0.639 0.397 0.277
0.52 0.926 0.698 0.554
0.86 0.997 0.852 0.745
1.00 1.000 0.888 0.796
unknown 1.000 0.824 0.679
Panel G: BPSb, c
Proxy Sharpe ratio:
0.22 0.857 0.442 0.319
0.52 1.000 0.739 0.622
0.86 1.000 0.878 0.805
1.00 1.000 0.908 0.851
unknown 1.000 0.841 0.745
Notes:
bMaximum correlations are reported that support the CAPM prediction.
cValues for the proxy Sharpe ratio are taken from Shanken (1987). These values are annualized. 0.52 is the expected value;
0.22 and 0.86 are - 1 and + 2 standard deviations away from this expected value, respectively. 1.00 is a value for the proxy
Sharpe ratio that is greater than any conceivable true value. Unknown means that the proxy Sharpe ratio is bootstrapped along
with every other estimated quantity in the expression determining an upper bound for the correlation between the proxy and the
market return.
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Table 3A
Summary statistics for size, B/M, and momentum portfolios, 10/7/77 - 9/25/87. The portfolio return series are measured
weekly (in percentage terms) so that relatively high frequency data is utilized (to estimate higher moments) that reduces day-
of-the-week and weekend effects as well as the effects of nonsynchronus trading and bid-ask bounce. The proxy return is
the CRSP market-value-weighted index of all securities on the NYSE, AMEX, and NASDAQ exchanges. Security returns are
constructed from the 25 size-B/M portfolios and the 25 size-momentum portfolios (each 55 sorts with breakpoints determined
by NYSE quintiles). "Small" is the average of the five low-market-cap portfolios, "Mid" the average of the five medium-market-
cap portfolios, and "Big" the average of the five large-market-cap portfolios. "Value" is the average of the five high-B/M portfolios,
"Neutral" the average of the five middle-B/M portfolios, and "Growth" the average of the five low-B/M portfolios. Finally,
"Losers" is the average of the five low-return-sorted portfolios, "Neutral" the average of the five middle-return-sorted portfolios,
and "Winners" the average of the five high-return-sorted portfolios.
Size B/M Momentum
Small Mid Large Value Neutral Growth Losers Draws Growth
Panel A: Excess returns
mean 0.221 0.226 0.151 0.257 0.205 0.140 0.077 0.184 0.316
stdev 1.96 1.98 1.99 1.79 1.83 2.49 2.31 1.82 2.43
skew -1.08 -0.52 0.04 -0.91 -0.54 -0.30 0.36 -0.39 -0.87
kurt 7.96 5.99 4.51 7.81 5.59 4.91 5.72 5.61 6.59
Panel B: Alpha Proxy
est 0.091 0.081 -0.002 0.130 0.068 -0.045 -0.081 0.048 0.141
std errora 0.048 0.031 0.016 0.035 0.024 0.034 0.048 0.025 0.044
Notes:
aHeteroskedasticity consistent
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Table 3B
Test results for size, B/M, and momentum portfolios, 10/7/77 - 9/25/87. Projection errors are the residuals from OLS
regressions of security returns on the proxy return. Structural errors are the residuals from linear equations relating security returns
to the proxy return, where the residual from each equation and the proxy return is allowed to covary. Gibbons, Ross, and Shanken
(1989), or GRS, Bootstrap Proposition 1 constant covariance (BPC), and Bootstrap Proposition 1 stochastic (BPS), are alternative
ways of determining the maximum correlation between the CRSP value-weighted proxy return and the market return that supports
the CAPM at a 5% significance level. GRS is based on the assumption that the projection errors are normally distributed. BPC is
also based on the projection errors, but assumes those errors to follow strong, univariate GARCH(1,1) processes with unknown
distributions. BPS is based on the assumption that the structural errors follow strong, univariate GARCH (1,1) processes with
unknown distributions.
Size B/M Momentum
Small Mid Large Value Neutral Growth Losers Draws Winners
Panel C: Projection errors
skew -0.71 -0.35 0.20 -0.77 -0.63 -0.13 0.95 -0.15 -0.97
kurt 7.00 4.90 3.72 7.64 5.57 3.88 8.35 5.06 7.10
Panel D: Structural errors
skew -0.77 -0.29 0.20 -1.06 -0.76 -0.15 1.08 -0.11 -0.55
kurt 7.39 4.58 3.69 9.29 6.23 4.03 9.26 4.91 5.50
Panel E: GRSb, c
Proxy Sharpe ratio:
0.22 0.437 0.244 0.352
0.52 0.759 0.518 0.671
0.86 0.888 0.707 0.831
1.00 0.913 0.758 0.867
Panel F: BPCb, c
Proxy Sharpe ratio:
0.22 0.291 0.220 0.286
0.52 0.590 0.465 0.577
0.86 0.785 0.660 0.770
1.00 0.835 0.719 0.821
unknown 0.772 0.614 0.733
Panel G: BPSb, c
Proxy Sharpe ratio:
0.22 0.353 0.231 0.316
0.52 0.645 0.483 0.644
0.86 0.815 0.672 0.849
1.00 0.872 0.728 0.899
unknown 0.810 0.644 0.795
Notes:
bMaximum correlations are reported that support the CAPM prediction.
cValues for the proxy Sharpe ratio are taken from Shanken (1987). These values are annualized. 0.52 is the expected value;
0.22 and 0.86 are - 1 and + 2 standard deviations away from this expected value, respectively. 1.00 is a value for the proxy
Sharpe ratio that is greater than any conceivable true value. Unknown means that the proxy Sharpe ratio is bootstrapped along
with every other estimated quantity in the expression determining an upper bound for the correlation between the proxy and the
market return.
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Table 4A
Summary statistics for size, B/M, and momentum portfolios, 11/6/87 - 9/26/97. The portfolio return series are measured
weekly (in percentage terms) so that relatively high frequency data is utilized (to estimate higher moments) that reduces day-
of-the-week and weekend effects as well as the effects of nonsynchronus trading and bid-ask bounce. The proxy return is
the CRSP market-value-weighted index of all securities on the NYSE, AMEX, and NASDAQ exchanges. Security returns are
constructed from the 25 size-B/M portfolios and the 25 size-momentum portfolios (each 55 sorts with breakpoints determined
by NYSE quintiles). "Small" is the average of the five low-market-cap portfolios, "Mid" the average of the five medium-market-
cap portfolios, and "Big" the average of the five large-market-cap portfolios. "Value" is the average of the five high-B/M portfolios,
"Neutral" the average of the five middle-B/M portfolios, and "Growth" the average of the five low-B/M portfolios. Finally,
"Losers" is the average of the five low-return-sorted portfolios, "Neutral" the average of the five middle-return-sorted portfolios,
and "Winners" the average of the five high-return-sorted portfolios.
Size B/M Momentum
Small Mid Large Value Neutral Growth Losers Draws Growth
Panel A: Excess returns
mean 0.172 0.220 0.221 0.242 0.217 0.149 0.075 0.207 0.336
stdev 1.54 1.58 1.71 1.47 1.43 1.95 2.05 1.37 1.95
skew -0.51 -0.44 -0.10 -0.30 -0.50 -0.35 0.15 -0.48 -0.51
kurt 6.51 5.36 4.14 5.26 5.58 4.91 5.95 5.91 4.39
Panel B: Alpha Proxy
est 0.029 0.039 0.008 0.079 0.047 -0.074 -0.134 0.044 0.112
std errora 0.048 0.032 0.017 0.033 0.023 0.040 0.054 0.023 0.038
Notes:
aHeteroskedasticity consistent
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Table 4B
Test results for size, B/M, and momentum portfolios, 11/6/87 - 9/26/97. Projection errors are the residuals from OLS
regressions of security returns on the proxy return. Structural errors are the residuals from linear equations relating security returns
to the proxy return, where the residual from each equation and the proxy return is allowed to covary. Gibbons, Ross, and Shanken
(1989), or GRS, Bootstrap Proposition 1 constant covariance (BPC), and Bootstrap Proposition 1 stochastic (BPS), are alternative
ways of determining the maximum correlation between the CRSP value-weighted proxy return and the market return that supports
the CAPM at a 5% significance level. GRS is based on the assumption that the projection errors are normally distributed. BPC is
also based on the projection errors, but assumes those errors to follow strong, univariate GARCH(1,1) processes with unknown
distributions. BPS is based on the assumption that the structural errors follow strong, univariate GARCH (1,1) processes with
unknown distributions.
Size B/M Momentum
Small Mid Large Value Neutral Growth Losers Draws Winners
Panel C: Projection errors
skew 0.24 0.09 0.14 0.88 -0.02 -0.16 0.74 0.29 -0.15
kurt 5.07 3.95 3.17 5.99 5.32 3.83 5.64 5.29 3.81
Panel D: Structural errors
skew -0.20 -0.08 0.11 0.86 -0.48 -0.16 0.60 -0.27 -0.18
kurt 6.50 4.74 3.25 6.36 6.13 3.69 6.55 7.02 3.95
Panel E: GRSb, c
Proxy Sharpe ratio:
0.22 1.000 0.388 0.165
0.52 1.000 0.712 0.372
0.86 1.000 0.858 0.553
1.00 1.000 0.889 0.611
Panel F: BPCb, c
Proxy Sharpe ratio:
0.22 0.554 0.310 0.174
0.52 0.892 0.597 0.385
0.86 1.000 0.780 0.562
1.00 1.000 0.828 0.619
unknown 1.000 0.941 0.714
Panel G: BPSb, c
Proxy Sharpe ratio:
0.22 0.636 0.366 0.172
0.52 0.971 0.661 0.383
0.86 1.000 0.826 0.562
1.00 1.000 0.866 0.619
unknown 1.000 0.931 0.690
Notes:
bMaximum correlations are reported that support the CAPM prediction.
cValues for the proxy Sharpe ratio are taken from Shanken (1987). These values are annualized. 0.52 is the expected value;
0.22 and 0.86 are - 1 and + 2 standard deviations away from this expected value, respectively. 1.00 is a value for the proxy
Sharpe ratio that is greater than any conceivable true value. Unknown means that the proxy Sharpe ratio is bootstrapped along
with every other estimated quantity in the expression determining an upper bound for the correlation between the proxy and the
market return.
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Table 5A
Summary statistics for size, B/M, and momentum portfolios, 10/3/97 - 9/28/07. The portfolio return series are measured
weekly (in percentage terms) so that relatively high frequency data is utilized (to estimate higher moments) that reduces day-
of-the-week and weekend effects as well as the effects of nonsynchronus trading and bid-ask bounce. The proxy return is
the CRSP market-value-weighted index of all securities on the NYSE, AMEX, and NASDAQ exchanges. Security returns are
constructed from the 25 size-B/M portfolios and the 25 size-momentum portfolios (each 55 sorts with breakpoints determined
by NYSE quintiles). "Small" is the average of the five low-market-cap portfolios, "Mid" the average of the five medium-market-
cap portfolios, and "Big" the average of the five large-market-cap portfolios. "Value" is the average of the five high-B/M portfolios,
"Neutral" the average of the five middle-B/M portfolios, and "Growth" the average of the five low-B/M portfolios. Finally,
"Losers" is the average of the five low-return-sorted portfolios, "Neutral" the average of the five middle-return-sorted portfolios,
and "Winners" the average of the five high-return-sorted portfolios.
Size B/M Momentum
Small Mid Large Value Neutral Growth Losers Draws Growth
Panel A: Excess returns
mean 0.166 0.133 0.094 0.177 0.150 0.057 0.007 0.138 0.293
stdev 2.63 2.49 2.11 2.22 2.16 3.12 3.61 2.04 3.12
skew -1.04 -0.60 -0.36 -1.00 -0.74 -0.76 0.03 -0.57 -0.90
kurt 9.85 5.62 5.00 8.53 5.78 7.96 5.51 5.85 9.91
Panel B: Alpha Proxy
est 0.087 0.048 0.021 0.107 0.077 -0.052 -0.102 0.070 0.190
std errora 0.072 0.048 0.038 0.054 0.043 0.054 0.096 0.043 0.067
Notes:
aHeteroskedasticity consistent
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Table 5B
Test results for size, B/M, and momentum portfolios, 10/3/97 - 9/28/07. Projection errors are the residuals from OLS
regressions of security returns on the proxy return. Structural errors are the residuals from linear equations relating security returns
to the proxy return, where the residual from each equation and the proxy return is allowed to covary. Gibbons, Ross, and Shanken
(1989), or GRS, Bootstrap Proposition 1 constant covariance (BPC), and Bootstrap Proposition 1 stochastic (BPS), are alternative
ways of determining the maximum correlation between the CRSP value-weighted proxy return and the market return that supports
the CAPM at a 5% significance level. GRS is based on the assumption that the projection errors are normally distributed. BPC is
also based on the projection errors, but assumes those errors to follow strong, univariate GARCH(1,1) processes with unknown
distributions. BPS is based on the assumption that the structural errors follow strong, univariate GARCH (1,1) processes with
unknown distributions.
Size B/M Momentum
Small Mid Large Value Neutral Growth Losers Draws Winners
Panel C: Projection errors
skew -0.11 0.16 1.15 -0.32 0.15 -0.02 1.09 0.81 -0.29
kurt 6.75 5.51 12.23 5.51 5.16 8.02 7.69 8.72 5.49
Panel D: Structural errors
skew -0.82 -0.44 -0.18 -1.01 -0.70 -0.46 0.89 -0.46 -0.84
kurt 9.33 5.62 5.29 9.22 5.59 8.06 7.13 6.11 10.07
Panel E: GRSb, c
Proxy Sharpe ratio:
0.22 1.000 1.000 0.469
0.52 1.000 1.000 0.788
0.86 1.000 1.000 0.904
1.00 1.000 1.000 0.926
Panel F: BPCb, c
Proxy Sharpe ratio:
0.22 0.648 0.427 0.337
0.52 0.955 0.766 0.645
0.86 1.000 0.928 0.836
1.00 1.000 0.960 0.883
unknown 0.910 0.714 0.579
Panel G: BPSb, c
Proxy Sharpe ratio:
0.22 0.771 0.434 0.391
0.52 1.000 0.798 0.741
0.86 1.000 0.975 0.933
1.00 1.000 1.000 0.974
unknown 0.966 0.655 0.597
Notes:
bMaximum correlations are reported that support the CAPM prediction.
cValues for the proxy Sharpe ratio are taken from Shanken (1987). These values are annualized. 0.52 is the expected value;
0.22 and 0.86 are - 1 and + 2 standard deviations away from this expected value, respectively. 1.00 is a value for the proxy
Sharpe ratio that is greater than any conceivable true value. Unknown means that the proxy Sharpe ratio is bootstrapped along
with every other estimated quantity in the expression determining an upper bound for the correlation between the proxy and the
market return.
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TABLE 6
Simulation evidence for the size of the three relative efficiency tests considered under the null hypothesis that the correlation
of the proxy return with the true market return is at least 90%. Errors to the excess security returns and excess proxy return
follow semi-strong GARCH(1,1) processes with standardized Gamma(2,1) innovations. Parameters for the GARCH processes
are the sample estimates obtained from the B/M portfolios measured over the weekly period 11/6/87 - 9/28/07 that are robust
to endogeneity of the proxy return. These parameter estimates are termed the "true" values. The Gamma(2,1) distribution is
chosen because, when combined with these GARCH parameters, this distribution produces errors with unconditional skewness
and kurtosis measures comparable to those described under Panel D for the B/M portfolios of Table 2B. Betas for the excess
security returns are the sample estimates from the same time period. Alpha proxies for each of the excess security returns are
calibrated from the sample returns so that (1) they are all equal and (2) they imply a 90% correlation between the proxy and the
market return. For the GRS test, the Sharpe Performance Measure for the proxy return is assumed to be known and is set equal
to the estimate from the original sample. For the BPC and BPS tests, the Sharpe Performance Measure is treated as unknown.
For all three test statistics, the simulations are conducted across 500 trials with excess return series of 1000 observations each.
When constructing the individual excess return series for each trial, the first 200 observations are dropped to avoid initialization
effects. For the BPC and BPS statistics, within each simulation trial is a bootstrap of the maximum correlation between the proxy
and market return conducted over 250 repetitions. In each case, the bootstrap routines use parameter estimates from the original
sample along with constant terms implied by the calibrated alpha proxies. Parameter estimates used in the BPC test assume that
innovations to the excess security returns are uncorrelated with the proxy return. Parameter estimates used in the BPS test are the
"true" values described above. The table reports rejection rates for the test statistics at 10%, 5%, and 1% significance levels.
Size =
Statistic 0.10 0.05 0.01
GRS 0.180 0.112 0.038
BPC 0.114 0.082 0.026
BPS 0.084 0.050 0.016
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